Impact of national culture in foreign military sales programs: a case study of the Swiss and Finnish F/A - 18 foreign military sales by Shaw, Carol E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1996-12
Impact of national culture in foreign military sales
programs: a case study of the Swiss and Finnish F/A
- 18 foreign military sales
Shaw, Carol E.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32037
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN FOREIGN 
MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY 





Carol E. Shaw 
December 1996 
Sandra M. Desbrow 
Alice Crawford 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
19970626 160 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect ofthis collection of information, including suggestions for 
reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 1996 Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN FOREIGN 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY OF THE SWISS AND FINNISH 
F/A-18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
6. AUTHOR Carol E. Shaw 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER 
Monterey CA 93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or 
position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
distribution unlimited 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis is a case study of the impact of the national cultures of buying nations on Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) programs. The sales of the F/A-18 fighter aircraft to Switzerland and Finland are specifically evaluated. The 
issues brought forth in this study will demonstrate the necessity for those employees who interact with people from foreign cultures to 
ensure that they posses adequate training in cross-cultural communications. In an era of declining defense budgets, defense 
contractors are pursuing foreign buyers vigorously. Increased competition from foreign competitors mandates the need for increased 
awareness of intercultural differences and improved skills in this area. Cross-cultural communications training opportunities for both 
Government employees arid contractor personnel are discussed, in addition to reviewing the current status of training received by the 
personnel assigned to two on-going FMS cases. Proper intercultural communications training will help defense contractors and 
Government agencies by resulting in more efficient programs with fewer misunderstandings and possibly in lower prices for the 
Government as a result of increased economies of scale due to the foreign sales. Recommendations for further research are provided. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Foreign Military Sales, intercultural interaction, cross-cultural communications, 
F/A-18 FMS, Switzerland, Finland, culture 
17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF 
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
q~ 
16. PRICE CODE 
20. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
UL 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
11 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN FOREIGN MILITARY 
SALES PROGRAMS: A CASE STUDY OF THE SWISS AND 
FINNISH F/A- 18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
Author: 
Approved by: 
Carol E. Shaw 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
B.A., University of Southern California, 1989 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT 
from the 




This thesis is a case study of the impact of the national cultures of buying nations 
on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs. The sales of the F/A-18 fighter aircraft to 
Switzerland and Finland are specifically evaluated. The issues brought forth in this study 
will demonstrate the necessity for those employees who interact with people from foreign 
cultures to ensure that they posses adequate training in cross-cultural communications. In 
an era of declining defense budgets, defense contractors are pursuing foreign buyers 
vigorously. Increased competition from foreign competitors mandates the need for 
increased awareness of intercultural differences and improved skills in this area. 
Cross-cultural communications training opportunities for both Government employees 
and contractor personnel are discussed, in addition to reviewing the current status of 
training received by the personnel assigned to two on-going FMS cases. Proper 
intercultural communications training will help defense contractors and Government 
agencies by resulting in more efficient programs with fewer misunderstandings and 
possibly in lower prices for the Government as a result of increased economies of scale 
due to the foreign sales. Recommendations for further research are provided. 
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During the last decade, international arms sales by United States (U.S.) 
defense companies have been increasing at an astounding rate. The 
downsizing of the U.S. military, in light of budget constraints and the 
changing world power balance, has led to a decrease in sales of military 
hardware in the domestic market. In an effort to remain viable businesses, 
many U.S. defense contractors have aggressively pursued sales in the 
international market. From 1986 to 1989 the U.S. Government sold $29.1 
billion of weaponry to developing nations via the foreign military sales 
(FMS) program. From 1990 to 1993 that figure more than doubled to $59.8 
billion and in 1993 over 70 percent of all sales agreements made with 
developing nations involved arms sales. [Ref 1 :p.1] 
As the number of FMS sales grows, U.S. Government personnel and 
contractors must become increasingly savvy in the undertaking of 
international negotiations and contract administration. A host of challenges, 
including the language barrier and cultural differences, await the U.S. 
contractor embarking on a foreign military sales program. The laws and 
regulations of the U.S. are observed in the contractual language of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the Letter of Offer and 
1 
Acceptance (LOA) signed by the U.S. Government and a foreign buying 
government. These documents stipulate the terms of the FMS program. 
However, as "sellers" being responsive to our foreign "buyers," it is 
imperative to recognize that the business norms, values, ethics, language, and 
relationships between buyers and sellers may vary wildly with that to which 
the average American business person is accustomed when dealing with 
another U.S. buyer. In order to ensure a solid U.S. presence in the arena of 
international arms sales, and to maintain positive, healthy relationships with 
foreign buyers who may have more funds to spend at a later date, U.S. 
Government officials and defense contractors involved in FMS must be more 
familiar with and sensitive to the cultural differences between the U.S. and its 
FMS buyers. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze how the culture of a buying 
nation may impact an FMS program. It is important for both U.S. 
Government officials and defense contractors to recognize that business 
relationships with foreign customers will be different from those with which 
they are accustomed. In order to ensure its place as a respected international 
business partner and continued business, which is becoming more imperative 
to the domestic defense industry, it is vital for the U.S. to become more 
sophisticated in developing relationships with customers from other cultures. 
This study analyzes the effects of the culture of a buying nation on the FMS 
2 
program. Specifically it examines the impact of cultural differences in the 
F/A-18 FMS programs between the U.S. and both Finland and Switzerland. 
B. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is the following: 
How does the culture of a buying nation affect a Foreign Military Sales 
program and how might that knowledge assist in the successful execution of 
an FMS program? 
Subsidiary questions to be addressed in assessing the cultural 
implications associated with an FMS program include: 
1) What are the key cultural factors that may affect an FMS or 
contractual relationship? 
2) To what extent are the cultural practices/differences of a buying 
nation evaluated when entering into a Foreign Military Sales agreement to 
determine possible effects that culture may have on negotiations/ 
administration of the program? 
3) What are the impacts of the Finnish and Swiss cultures on their 
respective F/A-18 Foreign Military Sales programs? 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study focuses on a case study of two FMS programs currently 
underway. The governments of Switzerland and Finland have each entered 
into FMS agreements to procure the F I A-18 and both programs are 
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sufficiently established to allow for an evaluation of the relationships 
developed between the sellers, the U.S. Government and defense contractors, 
and the buyers, the Swiss and Finnish government agents and contractors 
involved in the procurement. A broad overview of each program is provided, 
along with evaluations by U.S. Government and contractor personnel, along 
with foreign personnel, regarding the efficiency with which the programs are 
unfolding. The efforts on the part of the U.S. personnel to provide training 
and preparation for interacting with foreign buyers are also addressed. These 
data are compared to an established model pertaining to international 
differences in work-related values and cross-cultural communications. 
Conclusions are drawn about preparation that did or did not occur by U.S. 
personnel to avoid any cultural conflicts which have arisen in the 
administration of the FMS agreements and to improve the perceptions of our 
foreign buyers about U.S. work methods and mannerisms. 
This study examines the FMS program primarily from the point of view 
of what U.S. personnel can and should do when interacting with international 
customers. Interviews conducted with several Swiss and Finnish persons 
involved in the programs provide insight into the perceptions of the buyers. 
This study does not provide recommendations to the foreign buyers regarding 
interaction with the U.S. Government or defense contractors, but rather 
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provides insight to the U.S. personnel on steps available to enhance American 
interaction overseas in the business world. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
The research and collection of data for this thesis is qualitative in 
nature and is comprised of three basic parts. Data were collected from the 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) F/A-18 Foreign Military Sales 
office, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, and 
available publications such as Jane's Defence Weekly pertaining to the 
contractual agreements in the sale of the F I A-18 to Finland and to 
Switzerland. 
The second section of data, international cultural differences and 
cross-cultural communications including differences in work-related values 
and national "personality," has been researched through comprehensive 
literature reviews. Included in this literature, and the cornerstone of the case 
study evaluation, is Geert Hofstede's, Culture's Consequences, International 
Differences in Work-Related Values (1984). Also reviewed were Craig 
Sorti's, The Art of Crossing Cultures (1990), and Michael Kublin's 
International Negotiating: A Primer for American Business Professionals 
(1995). Intercultural training programs were also examined. These training 
programs encompass those available to Federal Government personnel by 
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Government agencies and to civilian contractors in the commercial 
marketplace. 
The final section of data focuses on interviews conducted with three 
groups of people. Personal interviews were conducted with NAVAIR 
program managers responsible for oversight of the Swiss and Finnish 
programs. Personal interviews were also conducted with Swiss procurement 
officials, Swiss subcontractors, and McDonnell Douglas and Northrop 
Grumman personnel assigned to the program in Switzerland. Telephonic 
interviews were conducted with U.S.-based McDonnell Douglas and Northrop 
Grumman personnel assigned to both the Swiss and Finnish F I A-18 programs. 
Interview questions varied with respect to the specific program and the 
perspective with which each person viewed the program. Questions 
concentrated on the training provided to personnel interacting with foreign 
agents, training received if interacting with foreign agents, or the perceptions 
of the opposite culture. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
A brief discussion of the remaining chapters is outlined below. 
1. Chapter II. Background 
This chapter provides a brief definition and explanation of Foreign 
Military Sales and why they have become an important factor in the U.S. 
defense industry. Also included is a detailed discussion of national cultural 
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differences with a concentration on the aforementioned -Geert Hofstede's 
Culture's Consequences. His model for identifying national cultural norms is 
introduced. The Chapter concludes with a summary of available cross cultural 
communications training to both Government and contractor personnel. 
2. Chapter III. Methodology 
This chapter discusses the interviews conducted with personnel from 
NA V AIR, defense contractors, and the host nations. An explanation of the 
analysis technique used to evaluate the Swiss and Finnish FMS programs 
from a cultural perspective is provided. 
3. Chapter IV. F/A-18 Foreign Military Sale to Switzerland 
This chapter is a summary and description of collected data from the 
F I A-18 sale to Switzerland. Included are statistical summaries and histories 
of the Swiss programs, as well as a representative summary of the 
perspectives of the individuals involved. An evaluation of the contractual 
relationships developed between the Swiss and the U.S. is provided, along 
with U.S. Government and contractor perceptions of the buyer/seller 
relationship and their impressions of the cultural differences present. These 
perceptions are analyzed using Hofstede's intercultural model. 
4. Chapter V. F/A-18 Foreign Military Sale to Finland 
This chapter is a summary and description of collected data from the 
F I A-18 sale to Finland. A summary of the history of the Finnish program is 
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provided, as well as a review of the perspectives of personnel involved. An 
evaluation of the contractual relationships developed between the Finns and 
the U.S. is provided, along with U.S. Government and contractor perceptions 
of the buyer/seller relationship and their impressions of the cultural 
differences present. 
intercultural model. 
These perceptions are analyzed using Hofstede's 
5. . Chapter VI. Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
In this chapter, a brief summary is provided, followed by conclusions 
and recommendations for the preparation and conduct of future Foreign 
Military Sale arrangements with respect to the consideration given to 
international cultural differences. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 
Arms sales by the United States to foreign nations are increasing at 
fairly steady rates, although worldwide the trend is for arms transfers to be 
decreasing. U.S. defense companies are searching for new markets in light of 
domestic defense drawdowns. [Ref 2:p.1] Although the actual dollar value of 
foreign military sales (FMS) by U.S. firms to other nations has decreased 
annually over the past three years, FMS agreements and foreign construction 
contracts still account for an excess of ten billion constant 1995 dollars 
annually; therefore, most defense companies are aggressively pursuing 
international markets. [Ref 3 :p.13 8] The Department of Defense (DoD) today 
forecasts that "the U.S. share of the world's arms market will increase from 
about 50 percent in 1993 to 63 percent by the year 2000." [Ref 4:p. C5] Some 
of the top recipients of U.S. arms in the last ten years include such nations as 
Saudi Arabia, Japan, Israel, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Australia, Spain, Germany, Egypt, the Netherlands, Greece, Thailand, 
Italy, Finland, and Switzerland. Today, some defense industries are 
attempting to sell their products in other nations such as Poland, Hungary, 
and the recently formed Czech Republic. Arms sales are a multi-billion dollar 
business spanning all nations and cultures on the globe. [Ref 3 :p. 141] 
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Two methods are commonly used by foreign governments in purchasing 
U.S. defense goods. These methods are the previously mentioned foreign 
military sale and the direct sales method. 
l. The Foreign Military Sales Method 
A FMS agreement is the means by which the "U.S. Government sells 
defense articles and services to foreign governments or international 
organizations." The FMS contract is a sales agreement between the U.S. 
Government and the foreign government. The U.S. Government then 
contracts with a prime U.S. defense contractor for the major end items 
requested by the buyer. The foreign government pays the U.S. Government, 
who in turn pays the prime contractor for its services. The Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DF ARS) details the procedures to be 
followed in negotiating and pricing FMS contracts and specifies that these 
acquisitions are to be conducted under the same acquisition and contract 
management procedures as any other defense acquisition; In other words, U.S. 
laws and regulations are applicable regardless of the fact that much of the 
effort may be conducted overseas. [Ref 5:p. 225.73-1-5] 
Of interest, however, is that although the U.S. Government is the entity 
entering into an agreement with the foreign government, it is often the prime 
contractor who has done the bulk of the "sales pitch" to the foreign 
government, investing months of time and large quantities of money in 
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marketing its products to the foreign buyer. By the time the FMS agreement 
is signed, the prime contractor has had extensive interaction with the buying 
nation's agents, including an often heated competition with other major 
arms-exporting nations, such as Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 
and a major source selection effort on the part of buying nation. 
In many FMS arrangements, the prime contractor further contracts with 
multiple U.S. and foreign subcontractors. Often, the prime has agreed to 
utilize host nation industry as subcontractors in a co-production agreement 
where the foreign government acquires the technology and "know-how" to 
manufacture a defense part or item. That part is then used in the final 
end-item purchased by the foreign buyer or may be used in end-items for 
other customers. Other agreements call for the U.S. firm to purchase an 
agreed upon amount of foreign manufactured goods and services which can 
include a wide variety of categories including furniture, candy, or even 
clothing, and market it in the U.S. for the foreign government. Such 
agreements are called "offsets" because the agreement to purchase foreign 
items is meant to offset some specific amount or percentage of that country's 
expenditures for U.S. defense items. In either case, offsets and co-production 
arrangements result in increased interaction between the prime contractor and 
members of the host nation. [Ref 6:p.644-646] 
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2. The Direct Sales Method 
The second method used by foreign governments to acquire U.S. 
defense goods is the direct sales method. This method involves a U.S. 
defense contractor selling directly to a foreign buyer and is regulated by the 
U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). The ITAR provides 
licensing and regulatory guidance for the import and export of all defense 
articles and technology. [Ref 6:p.656] A direct sale also requires the 
approval of the Office of Defense Trade Control, an agency of the Department 
of State, which coordinates requests for permission to export defense goods 
and issues an export license prior to actual exportation of any defense article. 
Unlike an FMS arrangement, the U~S. Government only passively monitors a 
direct sale. Although the same cultural interaction occurs in a direct sale 
between a U.S. contractor and the buying nation, the case study presented 
herein applies to FMS arrangements only. [Ref 7:p.23-24] 
B. WHY FOREIGN MILITARY SALES? 
The decline of the defense budget has propelled U.S. military 
contractors to FMS alternatives to remain viable businesses. [Ref 2:p.1] 
During the height of the Reagan defense "buildup," $390 billion (in constant 
1995 dollars), comprising 6.2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), was 
allocated to DoD's budget. In 1995, that figure had diminished to $252 
billion and 3.5 percent of the GDP. [Ref 8:p.1] 
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This reduction in defense spending corresponds to fewer domestic arms 
purchases and reduced profits for defense contractors. In response to this 
changing environment, defense contractors have turned to the overseas 
market. From 1987 to 1992, the value of arms sales from the U.S. to foreign 
buyers almost quadrupled from $8.7 billion in 1987 to $24.1 billion. Today, 
foreign sales account for almost 25 percent of American arms production. In 
excess of 20 percent of Raytheon Corporation's sales in 1992 were from 
Patriot missile sales to foreign nations. Likewise, more than 20 percent of 
then Martin-Mariettas' total sales in 1994 were due to foreign orders. In some 
cases, foreign sales alone account for ongoing production of some U.S. 
weapon systems. For example, McDonnell Douglas now sells the F-15 fighter 
aircraft only to foreign customers. Saudi Arabia has purchase seven times as 
many General Dynamic M1-A2 battle tanks as the U.S. Army in the past five 
years. [Ref 2:p.l-4] 
The U.S. Government has encouraged arms sales to our allies, and each 
Service has large offices devoted to the management of FMS programs. 
These programs not only serve to protect and maintain the domestic arms 
industrial base, but are also in line with current U.S. policy to reduce 
domestic defense spending, while relying more heavily on our allies 
involvement in regional conflicts. Additionally, some FMS programs have 
resulted in reduced costs to the U.S. Government. In FMS programs 
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involving weaponry that is still being procured domestically, a large volume 
of foreign sales may provide an unexpected bonus in the form of reduced 
costs due to the larger numbers produced - a makeshift "quantity discount" 
spread over a number of customers. For example, McDonnell-Douglas has 
contracts for the sales of over 325 F I A-18 fighter aircraft to foreign 
customers, which has reduced the cost of the 871 F I A-18s procured by the 
U.S. Navy by over two million dollars per aircraft. [Ref 2:p.2-3] 
C. CULTUREANDINTERCULTURALINTERACTION 
1. Foreign Military Sales and National Culture 
In the existing domestic defense environment, it is understandable why 
the U.S. Government has encouraged foreign military sales and why U.S. 
contractors have focused increasingly on marketing their goods overseas. 
Additionally, while the Government's role in administering foreign military 
sales often is in the interest of maintaining healthy international relations, the 
contractors recognize the importance of maintaining a good relationship with 
their foreign customers for future sales. Although successfully lobbying a 
foreign government to purchase a weapon system is, in itself, a milestone 
celebrated by a company, many contractors discover that the administration of 
the program is fraught with difficulties and circumstances unlike those 
expected in what is considered to be a "normal" buyer-seller relationship, 
when only the U.S. Government or another U.S. company is involved as a 
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buyer. Many of these difficulties and stumbling blocks can -be attributed to a 
factor that seems obvious, but which, surprisingly, is often overlooked or 
minimized in foreign sales. Simply put, foreign buyers are the products of 
foreign cultures. 
Program managers will attest to the multitude of challenges and 
problems that arise between the program office and a prime contractor. The~e 
differences may include differences of opinion regarding the interpretation of 
contract terms and conditions, methods of cost control and cost accounting, or 
attempts to resolve the inevitable "slide" in the schedule of a program. The 
challenge presented to the Government officials and the contractor personnel 
involved in a program is to forge a solid relationship, which is initiated 
during contract negotiations and continues throughout the life of a program. 
The evolution of this relationship is characterized by gaining mutual respect, 
trust, and confidence in working towards a shared goal of a successful 
program. 
Many of the difficulties prevalent in a program arise due to the 
divergent perspectives of the Government "buyer" side, and of the contractor 
"seller" side. These differences in perspective and attitude are a direct result 
of the disparate motivations and cultures of the buyer and of the seller. 
Current management training emphasizes how corporate cultures can vary 
among many companies. [Ref 9:p.258] With domestic management 
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philosophy concentrating on culture as a significant factor iri the development 
of synergy between contractual partners, it should be no surprise that when a 
foreign nation culture, in addition to the foreign corporate culture within that 
national culture, is added to the mix, significant consideration must be given 
to the impact that a new and unfamiliar culture will have on program 
management. When interpretation of contract terms and conditions is a 
challenge to program managers and contractors in a purely domestic program 
where most players are essentially familiar with the Government regulations 
and are intimately knowledgeable of the nuances of the language of the 
contract- English; how must that challenge multiply when applying and 
explaining U.S. regulations and business norms to foreign buyers? 
2. Why Study Culture? 
Gaining an understanding of the culture of a foreign buyer is a logical 
first step in participating in international business. Unfortunately, U.S. 
businesses have not earned a good reputation around the world when it comes 
to interacting with foreign businesses and as tourists. It is due to this 
deficiency that, 
The same bull-in-a-china-shop attitude toward foreign cultures 
and languages that has always cost American travelers respect 
overseas is now costing American business billions of dollars a 
year, according to experts. [Ref 1 O:p. 245] 
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For example, General Motors lost a large sales opportunity when it made a 
"classic cultural blunder" by failing to change the name of its Nova model 
when introducing the car into the company's South American market; "No 
va" means "it doesn't go" in Spanish. [Ref 11 :p.xv] 
It is believed that due to geographic considerations, executives from 
European or Japanese companies have more opportunity to develop their 
intercultural skills; however, in an era of international business, U.S. 
business people must become more sensitive and aware of cultural interaction. 
With a domestic market of over 225 million people, Americans have been able 
to continue to be highly parochial. In other words, they tend to view the 
world from their own perspectives and disallow other perspectives as wrong, 
unworthy, or inferior. [Ref 12 :p.11-13] Until recently, American corporations 
have been successful regardless of the fact that while two-thirds of U.S. 
executives today believe that an emphasis on the international outlook is very 
important, only one-third believe that experience overseas is important. Only 
20 percent regard foreign language training as important. On the other hand, 
82 percent of non-U.S. companies' executives believe that an international 
perspective is important, 70 percent believe foreign experience is vital, and 
fully 64 percent feel foreign language training is important. Unfortunately, 
most management training and management schools are located in the U.S. 
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This tends to reinforce parochial American views, with little emphasis on the 
cultures of other customers or competitors. [Ref 12:p.12-13] 
Regardless of the fact that cultural interaction has become more 
common during the twentieth century, there are always difficulties whenever 
extensive cross-cultural interaction occurs. This is due to the fact that people 
from one culture have become accustomed to their "norms." They define what 
is "correct" by what is correct in their culture. Actions taken by foreigners 
that are totally "right and proper" in their minds due to their socialization and 
culture, may be in great conflict or seem inappropriate to a person from 
another culture. The result may be prejudice and stereotype development, 
even in the minds of those who believed they were prepared to meet, interact, 
or live with, a new or unfamiliar culture. [Ref 13 :p.16] An example of this 
phenomenon follows: 
A Swiss executive waits more than an hour past the appointed 
time for his Latin colleague to arrive and sign a supply contract. 
In his impatience, he concludes that Latins must be lazy and 
totally unconcerned about business. He has misevaluated his 
colleague by negatively comparing him to his own cultural 
standards. Implicitly, he has labeled his own group's behavior as 
"good" (Swiss arrive on time and that is good) and the other 
group's behavior as "bad" (Latins do not arrive on time and that 
is bad). [Ref 12:p.83] 
A common myth has permeated not only international corporate 
America, but the Federal Government as well, that cultural differences are 
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certainly important and merit great amounts of attention when the 
international buyer's culture is "really" different from that of the U.S., such as 
the cultures of Japan, Saudi Arabia, or Malaysia. But, when the international 
buyer is from Western Europe, culture is not a big factor, because American 
culture is rooted in Western European culture and history, so "they are just 
like us." While there are presumably more similarities in culture, due to the 
still significant differences, this assumption often leads to numerous 
misunderstandings and poor interpretations of the actions of Western 
European customers. 
More than one-third of all Americans sent overseas to administer 
contracts return earlier than their personal tours' original schedule. This is 
somewhat understandable for "exotic" countries such as Saudi Arabia where 
the cultural differences are so wide as to impact every aspect of life for the 
employees and their families. According to one study, an average of 68 
percent of Americans sent to Saudi Arabia failed to complete their tours. 
However, the numbers are high for Western European countries as well. 
Thirty-seven percent of the Americans working on the F -16 General Dynamics 
sale in Western Europe returned to the U.S. prematurely and fully 18 percent 
of Americans sent to England returned early. None of the U.S. personnel sent 
to England received any cultural training, due to the assumption that England 
would pose no cultural difficulties for Americans. It should be noted that the 
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reasons for early return range from difficulties with professional business 
interaction to simple inability to adapt to living in a foreign country with no 
prior cultural adaptation training. [Ref 11 :p.xiv] Often, " ... failures in 
overseas assignments are not due to technical incompetence, but rather lack of 
adjustment to a new and different culture." [Ref 14] 
The costs of these early returns are high. The U.S. company has lost an 
employee who may have extensive knowledge and experience in a program. 
The possibility exists that the employee may have committed a "cultural 
blunder," putting the company in a position of having to rebuild trust with its 
foreign counterparts. Finally, the financial expenses incurred by the company 
may be large due to high rotation of personnel in a foreign program. 
The premature return of an overseas employee, a spouse, and two 
children can cost a company more than $210,000. Every time 
one of its volunteers comes home early, the Peace Corps loses 
50-75 percent of the estimated $7000 it costs the agency to 
recruit and train one worker. [Ref 11 :p.xiv] 
It would seem that control of such high turnover rates to reduce costs and to 
preserve the knowledge base on a program would be a high priority for U.S. 
defense contractors. 
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3. Culture Defined 
Current literature includes multitudes of definitions for "culture." 
Robert Winthrop's Dictionary of Concepts in Cultural Anthropology (1991) 
defines culture as, 
(1) That set of capacities which distinguishes Homo sapiens as a 
species and which is fundamental to its mode of adaptation. 
(2) The learned, cumulative product of all social life. (3) The 
distinctive pattern of thought, action, and value that characterize 
the members of a society or group. [Ref 15:p.50] 
Culture is an abstract idea, characterized by the actions, habits, and behaviors 
of the people from a particular region or nation. Confucius stated, "All 
people are the same, it's only their habits that are different." The cultural 
backgrounds of individuals will determine not only national habits and 
personalities, but also those of corporations and governments. A leading 
Japanese industrial statesman observed that "U.S. and Japanese companies are 
95 percent alike in their approaches and operations, but the five percent 
difference is what really matters." [Ref 16:p.x] 
4. Successful Intercultural Interaction 
Michael Kublin's International Negotiating: A Primer for American 
Business Professionals (1995) offers a variety of characteristics necessary for 
successful interaction with a new or different culture. Among these attributes 
are a high tolerance for ambiguity, creativity, and flexibility, a bilingual 
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ability if possible, humor, stamina, empathy, and curiosity. Applying these 
characteristics consistently when dealing with people from foreign cultures 
helps a businessperson to keep an open mind and positive attitude. They also 
reduce the frustration felt when not fully understanding the actions or 
motivations of their foreign counterparts. A close examination of these 
characteristics reveals that they are actually necessary in any business 
interaction, whether it be with a foreign culture or not. [Ref 17:p.23-28] 
A very simple model is suggested in Craig Sorti's, The Art of Crossing 
Cultures (1990), for people who are interacting with a foreign culture either 
in a temporary manner such as negotiations or on a more permanent basis, 
such as for expatriates living and working in a new country. The model is 
based on an understanding that people view the world from the culture in 
which they are raised. When an incident occurs that is in conflict with or 
differs from the norm that is expected from our own culture, people have an 
involuntary reaction which is normally some level of discomfort. The 
important aspect to this occurrence is what we do following that discomfort. 
Withdrawing from the situation and developing negative stereotypes is 
common. A better response is to become aware of our internal conflict and 
determine what is causing the adverse response. In this manner, people 
become more aware of the cultural differences that characterize the situation, 
and that knowledge may lead to a more logical response rather than a purely 
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emotional one. In effect, training oneself to develop opinions and perceptions 
logically rather than allowing emotions and discomfort to dictate a response 
will not only lead to greater insight into a new culture, but will also make the 
experience of interacting with that culture a more beneficial one. The graphic 
model of this process of adjustment to a new culture is depicted at Figure 2-1. 
[Ref 11 :p47-62] 
5. Evaluating Culture 
An understanding of the elements of national culture and the leadership 
styles that emerge from various cultures is of enormous value to the 
Government officials and contractors involved in FMS programs. In Culture's 
Consequences, International Differences in Work-Related Values (1984), 
Geert Hofstede sought to determine the effect that culture has on the behavior 
and attitudes of employees and managers in different countries. Surveying 
over 160,000 managers and employees of IBM in over 60 nations, Hofstede 
developed ·a model comprised of four primary dimensions across which 
national cultures consistently vary, regardless of the passage of time, the ages 
of those. surveyed, or the level of employment of those surveyed. The four 
dimensions are Power Distance, Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, and 
Masculinity. Each nation was assigned a composite rating in each category, 
providing a scale or index with which to compare one nation's culture to 
another. A brief discussion of each dimension follows. 
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We expect others to be just 
like us , but they aren't 
Thus, a cultural incident occurs 
And we withdraw 
Causing a reaction 
(anger, fear, etc.) 
/ 
I We become aware of our reaction 
We reflect on its cause 
And our reaction subsides 
We observe the situation 
Which results in developing culturally 
appropriate expectations 
Figure 2.1. The Process of Adjustment (From Ref [11]) 
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Power Distance is the extent to which a society accepts that power in 
institutions and organizations is distributed unequally. Hofstede's definition 
of Power Distance is, 
... the extent to which a boss can determine the behavior of a 
subordinate, and the extent to which a subordinate can determine 
the behavior of the boss. [Ref 18:p72] 
In other words, how likely are employees to accept large variances in the 
treatment of themselves versus the status of their employers? 
The Power Distance Index (PDI) rating can be used to predict various 
attitudes and beliefs within the nation. PDis ranged from 11 to 94, with the 
higher number signifying greater discomfort or formality between employer 
and employee. In countries with a high Power Distance Index, such as the 
Philippines and Mexico, powerholders are entitled to greater privilege and 
employees fear disagreement with their boss. In contrast, in a low Power 
Distance nation such as Israel or Denmark, employees are less afraid to 
disagree with their supervisors and everyone should have equal rights. 
[Ref 18:p.65-92] 
Individualism refers to a loose social framework in which most people 
expect to take care of themselves, whereas collectivism occurs when there is a 
tight social framework in which people relate strongly to a group of people, 
possibly relatives or a clan, who are expected to care for each other. The 
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Individualism Index (IDV) spans from 12 for more collective societies, to 91 
for the most individualistic society surveyed. Not surprisingly, the United 
States and Australia, which are highly individualistic in relation to the other 
surveyed nations, are characterized by an "I" mentality with an emphasis on 
self-preservation. Countries that are highly collective, such as Columbia and 
Venezuela are very "we" conscious and people expect their organizations to 
help defend them. [Ref 18:p.148-173] 
The third dimension, Uncertainty Avoidance, is the extent to which a 
society feels threatened by undefined or rapidly changing situations and to 
what lengths ambiguity is avoided. Hofstede believes that " ... extreme 
uncertainty creates intolerable anxiety and human society has developed ways 
to cope with the inherent uncertainty of our living on the brink of· an 
uncertain future." [Ref 18:p.111] The Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) 
ranges from rating of 8 for Singapore, to 112 for Greece, with the lower rating 
signifying more difficulty coping with uncertainty. Characteristics common 
in nations with a high capacity for handling uncertainty include a more 
positive attitude towards young adults and a belief that fewer rules are better. 
In cultures with lower uncertainty tolerance, younger people are more suspect 
and rules are absolutely needed. [Ref 18:p110-140] 
Finally, the Masculinity Index (MAS) expresses the extent to which 
respondents endorsed more traditionally masculine attitudes and preferences 
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such as being more assertive versus a culture that tended to convey 
traditionally feminine characteristics of a more nurturing vein. The MAS 
ranges from a rating of 5 for Sweden to 95 for. Japan. The higher score 
indicates a society that tends to display traditionally masculine attributes. A 
higher MAS such as those of Japan, Austria, and Venezuela indicates a 
greater belief in gender inequality and occupations that are considered to be 
for "men only" or for "women only." Lower MAS countries such as Finland, 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden typically display attitudes demonstrating 
greater equality of the sexes and less stereotyping of employment 
opportunities. [Ref 18:p.176-207] 
Hofstede's model is a useful tool, which does not stereotype a culture 
but seeks to define the culture comparatively based on other cultures' 
tendencies. The model can be a tremendous source of information on what 
generally to expect when interacting with people from another culture. 
Hofstede includes numerous lists of information including the consequences · 
of the various index differences for the societies at large and for organizations 
within the culture, the origins of the various index differences, and 
characteristics that typify lower or higher index ratings. The Appendix 
contains a more detailed list of the societal norms of the four dimensions of 
the model. 
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6. Intercultural Training Programs 
A wide variety of intercultural training programs now exist for 
employees of the civilian contractors and of the Federal Government. This 
section reviews some of the options available to personnel assigned to FMS 
cases to educate them in the area of cross-cultural communication. 
Several agencies of the Federal Government offer courses that include 
information on intercultural interaction. The Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management (DISAM), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is 
responsible for conducting courses of study to prepare military and civilian 
personnel for assignments in security assistance management positions, which 
include personnel working on FMS programs. [Ref 6:p.89] According to the 
Director, Management Studies at DISAM, ten courses are offered including an 
Overseas Course for personnel assigned to overseas posts. This course 
includes six to eight hours of cross-cultural training, which is regionally 
based. Most personnel assigned to FMS cases who are based in the U.S. do 
not attend the Overseas Course, but rather attend the Case Manager's Course 
or the Program Manager's course, both of which include a brief overview of 
cultural factors. The textbooks for these courses do offer a list of 
recommended readings on international communications. [Ref 19] 
Another alternative for Government employees is the Special 
Operations' Cross Cultural Communications Course, Eglin Air Force Base, 
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Florida. This is a five-day course open to all Government employees that 
includes information about U.S. culture and attitudes, traits of other cultures, 
and teaches "mindfulness" of other cultures to students. The training can 
provide regionally based cultural information, if requested. The instructors of 
this course will also travel to distant locations to present the training to large 
groups. [Ref 20] 
As more U.S. companies turn to international business, more consultant 
companies are offering seminars on cross-cultural topics. For defense 
contractors, many options now exist to expose their employees to cultural 
factors prior to involvement with foreign buyers. 
One example is Professional Training Associates, a company that 
specializes in cross-cultural training for corporations. This company will 
travel to the corporation to provide a presentation to a large audience and will 
either tailor the seminar to a particular region or will present a broad 
overview of how to be aware of cultural factors. The owner of Professional 
Training Associates, Sheida Hodge, stresses that rather than learning by trial 
and error in the international arena, executives can gain the knowledge and 
skills to improve cross-cultural communications from· the beginning. She 
believes that, with training, an employee can experience greater peace of 
mind when confronted by a different culture and that employee can 
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concentrate on accomplishing missions and goals rather than experiencing 
frustration and anxiety. [Ref 21] 
The Intercultural Training Institute (ITI) of the University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, offers similar services. ITI's programs include 
assistance in screening and selecting expatriate candidates and cross-cultural 
training for domestic support staff who communicate with foreign affiliates. 
Both of these are circumstances that occur for defense contractors in FMS 
cases. [Ref 14:p.3] ITI asserts that cross-cultural training will "facilitate 
adjustment to new cultural and work environments, increase expatriate 





Research for this study is primarily qualitative in nature and consisted 
of three basic parts: media searches, interviews, and a literature review. The 
literature review discussed in the previous chapter provided the background 
on intercultural interaction and the framework for the case study analysis. 
B. DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
Data collection was accomplished through the use of media searches 
and interviews. A brief overview of each method is discussed in this section. 
1. Media Searches 
Data base searches and media reviews are the sources for detailed facts 
and figures regarding the FMS arrangements for both Finland and 
Switzerland. Searches on the LEXIS/NEXIS system yielded a large number 
of articles with information about the sales of the F I A-18 aircraft to 
Switzerland and Finland, to include the numbers, sales price, and political 
climates in the respective countries at the time of the agreement. Many 
articles were located that address the previously discussed issues surrounding 
the growth of Foreign Military Sales and arms transfers. Articles, editorials, 
and press minutes were located in such periodicals as The New York Times, 
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Neue Zuercher Zeitung, The Christian Science Monitor, Jane's Defence 
Weekly, and Reuter's news services. 
2. Interviews 
Interviews with personnel involved in the Swiss and Finnish FIA-18 
FMS programs provided specific information for the case study. These 
interviews were both telephonic and personal, completed during travel to the 
Swiss F I A-18 assembly site in Emmen, Switzerland and to the Naval Air 
Systems Command (NAVAIR), Arlington, Virginia. Telephonic interviews 
were conducted with the program manager of the Swiss F I A-18 program for 
McDonnell Douglas and the vice-president of Marketing for Finavitec, a 
Finnish subcontractor to McDonnell Douglas. Personal interviews were 
conducted in Switzerland with two Swiss program managers, the 
Northrop Grumman project director for Switzerland and the McDonnell 
Douglas program director. NAVAIR program managers for both Finland and 
Switzerland and the F I A-18 Deputy Program Manager for International 
Programs were also interviewed in person at the Naval Air Systems 
Command. 
Interview questions varied depending on the nationality of the subject 
and the agency employing the subject. Some questions were very specific, 
such as whether or not the subject spoke the language of the buyer or seller, 
depending on the nationality. All U.S. subjects were questioned about any 
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training they had received or provided to other employees- interacting with 
foreign buyers. The interviews with the Finnish and Swiss gentlemen were 
not expected to yield specific information about the programs, but to provide 
a general perspective of the buyers' impressions of the U.S. participants, 
attitudes, and business approaches. 
C. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
The previous chapter introduced the cultural analysis performed by 
Geert Hofstede in Culture's Consequences, which suggested four dimensions 
of national culture. The indices derived from Hofstede's analysis provide the 
basis for the analysis to be performed herein. 
The case to be analyzed in this study involves the sale of the F I A-18 
aircraft to Switzerland and Finland, and the resultant contacts between people 
from Switzerland/Finland and people from the United States. This contact is 
necessary not only in the negotiation of the sale, but in the successful 
administration of the contracts. Both of these FMS arrangements were 
initiated in the early 1990s and the working relationships between the 
Swiss/Finns and the U.S. personnel are long-term in nature. 
More than 60 countries were included in Hofstede's analysis of 
international differences and cultural dimensions. Switzerland, Finland, and 
the United States were among the nations surveyed and indexed. This study 
will utilize Hofstede's indices as benchmarks from which to analyze the data 
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collected through the interview process. The analysfs discusses the 
characteristics that could have been anticipated from people who are native to 
the countries in question, based on the societal norms and consequences of 
differentiation on an index. The case study also examines if the impressions 
and information provided by the U.S. personnel involved in the F/A-18 FMS 
cases about their Finnish and Swiss counterparts are supported by Hofstede's 
indices. More importantly, the question of whether or not the anticipation of 
these characteristics, and appropriate adjustments to U.S. expectations and 
approaches, were accomplished through "on-the-job-training" after years of 
interaction and cultural missteps, and whether these realizations could have 
been brought about earlier through intercultural training. 
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IV. F/A-18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALE TO SWITZERLAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and analyzes the cultural implications of the 
Foreign Military Sale to Switzerland of the F/A-18. Included is a discussion 
introducing the facts of the F I A-18 sale to Switzerland. This is followed by a 
sample of the perspectives of some U.S. and Swiss personnel involved in the 
administration of the FMS case, to include an examination of the cultural 
training attended or received by the U.S. personnel. The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the Swiss culture using Hofstede's model and indices, 
comparing the information available from Hofstede's indices with the 
observations of the FMS personnel. 
B. F/A-18 SALE TO SWITZERLAND 
In 1993 the government of Switzerland completed negotiations to 
purchase 34 F/A-18 fighter aircraft (24 single-seat F/A-18Cs and 8 two-seat 
F/A-18Ds) from the U.S. Government as a Foreign Military Sale. McDonnell 
Douglas is the prime contractor, with Northrop Grumman, General Electric, 
General Motors, and Hughes as the major U.S. subcontractors. NAVAIR 
provides administrative oversight, management, and support, with a staff of 
approximately 25 people assigned specifically to the Swiss program. The sale 
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price for the aircraft was approximately $3.1 billion, with $ i.3 billion of that 
allocated for extended service and training. [Ref 22:p.2-3] 
The first two aircraft were assembled in St. Louis, with the remaining 
32 produced and assembled in Switzerland with parts both imported from the 
U.S. and parts produced by five major Swiss subcontractors. The Swiss 
companies are subcontracted directly to both McDonnell Douglas and to 
Northrop Grumman, necessitating a close working relationship between the 
American contractors and their Swiss counterparts. The Swiss Defense 
Technology and Procurement Agency (GRD) functions as the Swiss program 
management office. The first two F I A-18s, assembled in St. Louis, were 
delivered to the Swiss in early 1996 after a successful first flight on 20 
January 1996. [Ref 23P.1-2] The first aircraft assembled in Emmen, 
Switzerland, underwent a successful first test flight on 3 October 1996. 
[Ref24:p.16] 
McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Grumman have had personnel 
assigned in Switzerland since 1993 and expect to maintain some minimal 
presence for at least five more years. More than 115 employees of the two 
companies have worked in Switzerland providing U.S. support to the program 
since mid-1993. At least 20 of these employees have lived in Switzerland for 
at least six months at a time, some with tours lasting in excess of two years. 
Many of these "permanent" residents also have family members accompanying 
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them, including school age children. The remainder of the employees have 
had working trips or shortened tours lasting anywhere from five days to three 
months. [Ref 25] 
Each corporation has a stateside F I A-18 program office as well. The 
program offices of McDonnell Douglas are located in St. Louis, where the 
overall program manager is assigned. The stateside program manager of 
Northrop Grumman is located in El Segundo, California. Each corporation's 
program office consists of some personnel who work exclusively in the U.S. 
and some who commute to Switzerland on a regular basis for meetings, 
quality inspections, repair assistance, or program assessments. 
C. THE SWISS AND THE FMS CASE 
Personnel from McDonnell Douglas, Northrop Grumman, and NAVAIR 
were interviewed regarding their roles in this FMS case and their opinions 
about the Swiss culture, based on the interaction each had had with Swiss 
nationals in the course of their business. Due to the candid nature of many of 
the answers received and in the interest of protecting the privacy of those 
interviewed who provided many purely opinion-based perspectives of their 
international customers, the names of these personnel will not be used. 
1. Intercultural Training 
All FMS case personnel interviewed were asked about the intercultural 
training they had received prior to embarking on a business relationship with 
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the Swiss or any other international business partner. Each person had at 
least two years of experience working on the Swiss program. NAVAIR 
employees assigned to the Swiss program had attended courses provided by 
the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) at Wright 
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, and a Cross Cultural Communications Course 
offered by the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Eglin Air Force 
Base, Florida. The DISAM course on the "Management of Security 
Assistance" deals primarily with familiarizing the student on the principles 
and procedures of a FMS case, but includes a chapter on living and working 
in a foreign country. The course textbook includes recommended readings on 
cross-cultural communications. [Ref 6:p.l17] The Cross Cultural 
Communications course offered by the U.S. Special Operations School is an 
intensive, five-day course that examines U.S. culture and attitudes. It also 
teaches the student to be mindful of cultural differences and what to expect 
from the cultures of various regions of the world. [Ref 20] The primary 
lesson one NAVAIR Swiss program employee took from this course is to 
remember that" ... the American way is not always the best way." [Ref 26] 
No U.S. contractor personnel had attended any formal cultural training. 
In addition to "screening" employees to ensure they are prepared to work in 
an international environment, the most prevalent method of familiarizing an 
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employee with the Swiss culture is through books, briefings, and discussions 
with program managers or employees already involved with the program. 
There are no formal classes in Swiss culture and environment. 
Books, articles and some briefings are provided and the 
individuals can use them to their purpose. We could do better in 
this area, but it is always a compromise between time available 
and need. [Ref 27] 
Another opinion is that the only challenge is the language barrier because 
"_. .. coming to Europe we are looking at the same culture." [Ref 28] Most of 
the literature provided to people en route to Switzerland for a permanent 
assignment consists mainly of "do's and don'ts" in order not to offend anyone 
and generalities such as to expect the Swiss to be stubborn, detail oriented, 
zealots for cleanliness, and dedicated to the search for perfection. One 
manager in industry who had been involved in a program in the Middle East 
in the 1980s stated that extensive briefings and training sessions were · 
provided to all personnel prior to going to the region. [Ref 29] This fact 
exemplifies a prevalent attitude that solid training on intercultural issues is 
necessary for some regions, but not for others. 
No data are available indicating the number of tours of duty in 
Switzerland that were cut short due to professional or personal difficulties in 
adapting to the Swiss and the Swiss culture. However, informal accounts of 
one employee removed from the program due to differences with the Swiss 
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were revealed. Another anecdote was of one family, including children, that 
moved to Switzerland and returned to the U.S. within a few months due to 
pre-existing medical problems with one child that could not be effectively 
handled in Switzerland due to the nature of the health care system and 
unfamiliarity with the region. The family did not reveal the problem to the 
company prior to moving, nor did they consider the ramifications of the 
problem in Switzerland, because it was so easily handled in the United States. 
[Ref 29] 
2. Perceptions of the Swiss 
When asked to provide a description of the Swiss "personality" based 
on their personal experiences with them, answers varied little regardless of 
the organizational background of the respondent. Descriptions typically 
included a range of adjectives including "focused," "conservative," 
"nationalistic," "isolationist," "narrow-minded," "prideful," and "reasonably 
stern." One manager from industry noted that the Swiss are very hard 
working and intense in their work. 
They tend to be more narrowly focused in their roles, preferring 
to defer questions and judgments about areas outside their 
specific role to others. They are more oriented to committee or 
consensus decisions than we tend to be. [Ref 27] 
An interesting point to note is that when asked this same question of himself, 
a Swiss manager responded that the Swiss are more quality oriented than 
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Americans and that he believes the Swiss have a greater sense of personal 
responsibility to a job than most Americans he has encountered. [Ref 30] 
Surprisingly, the language barrier was not perceived to be a big 
problem. English is widely spoken and understood by the Swiss, and 
although they acknowledged a pleasure in knowing that the Americans were 
attempting to learn German, the fact that all contracts are in English did not 
concern the Swiss managers. However, a U.S. manager based in Switzerland 
noted that sometimes the language barrier can be used by the Swiss as an 
"excuse" when disagreements arise over specifications or requirements in the 
contracts. [Ref 29] 
The Swiss drive for high quality products provided the largest 
disagreements with their American counterparts. "The Americans require 
higher quality (from Swiss parts) than they provide." [Ref 30] Although 
many of the U.S. personnel indicated a belief that the Swiss did not like to 
accept blame or responsibility for quality problems experienced, both 
NAVAIR and contractor managers admitted that the Swiss drive for high 
quality had, in fact, resulted in reexamining and refining many of the 
processes used in building parts for the aircraft. "Their concern for very high 
quality and value has made all of us more aware, to our benefit, of our 
products, processes, and customer orientation." [Ref 27] 
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D. INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL INDICES 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the Swiss culture by using the 
cultural dimensions discussed by Geert Hofstede. A comparison of the U.S. 
and Swiss ratings on the four cultural indices will provide an insight into the 
differences between the American culture of the FMS caseworkers and their 
Swiss counterparts. This analysis reveals a correlation between what has been 
discovered by the U.S. personnel in the course of their work and the 
information that could have been available to them through cultural specific 
research. Table 4.1 lists the four cultural indices, along with the index values 
for both the U.S. and Switzerland. The four cultural dimensions included are 
the Power Distance Index (PDI), the Individualism Index (IDV), the 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), and the Masculinity Index (MAS). 
United States Switzerland 
Power Distance 40 34 
Individualism 91 68 
Uncertainty 46 58 
Avoidance 
Masculinity 62 70 
Table 4.1. U.S. and Swiss Indices Value [After Ref 18] 
Using the information in Table 4.1, a manager anticipating doing 
business with the Swiss can become educated about what to expect in broad 
terms. An analysis of the variability between the U.S. values and the Swiss 
42 
values will enlighten an employee about the tendencies of-the Swiss, using 
the U.S. culture, which is well known to that employee. A list of social 
norms from each dimension comparing a low-value country with a high-value 
country is set out in the Appendix. 
A cursory examination of the data above reveals that the U.S. and 
Switzerland are ranked very closely in several categories, with the exception 
of individualism. Therefore, the value of further analysis lies primarily in a 
comparative sense. For example, both Switzerland and the U.S. exhibit a low 
Power Distance Index, with Switzerland's being slightly lower than that of the 
U.S. The conclusion may then be drawn that the average Swiss person, and 
hence organization, tends to display the characteristics listed in the Appendix 
for a low-PDI country to a slightly higher degree than the average U.S. person 
or organization. 
1. Power Distance 
Switzerland's lower PDI value reveals a number of characteristics about 
the nation and its people. Low PDI countries indicate a nation with a strong 
sense of independence and federalism, with a great need for technology. 
Development of a strong middle class with general questioning of authority is 
typical. There is a belief that inequality should be minimized and that 
interdependency is crucial. Another connotation of a low PDI is a mixed 
feeling about employees' participating in management, which is demonstrated 
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by the absence of unions in the Swiss organizations involved- in the FMS case. 
[Ref 18:p.77-107] 
2. Individualism 
The United States is the highest rated country of all of those surveyed 
on the Individualism Index with a value assigned of 91. Switzerland's IDV of 
68 suggests a society more geared to the individual than to the group, but less 
so than that of the U.S. From this difference, an American working with the 
Swiss can expect to encounter a greater belief in the decisions of a group, an 
observation that was made by one U.S. manager interviewed. Because 
Switzerland's IDV does reflect a fairly high level of individualism, it should 
be anticipated that the characteristics described for a high IDV country in the 
Appendix are accurate for Switzerland. If it does not seem so to an American 
in Switzerland, this is probably due to the fact that they are "less 
individualistic" than the U.S. Other characteristics of high IDV countries are 
a strong tradition of individualist thinking and action and balanced political 
systems, both of which accurately describe Switzerland and its tradition of 
neutrality and a long lasting federalism. [Ref 18:p.158-173] Switzerland's 
strong sense of individualism as a nation manifested itself in a referendum in 
1986 voted on by the people that rejected membership in the United Nations. 
[Ref 31 :p.328] 
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3. Uncertainty Avoidance 
The Uncertainty Avoidance Index value for Switzerland also 
demonstrates a noted difference between the U.S. culture and that of the 
Swiss. Switzerland received a higher UAI than the U.S., which, according to 
Hofstede, means a greater preference for clear requirements and instructions 
and a desire for managers to be expert in their fields. [Ref 18:p.l32] Both of 
these characteristics were mentioned by U.S. managers working in 
Switzerland. "They tend to be more narrowly focused in their roles, 
preferring to defer questions and judgments about areas outside their specific 
role to others," one manager said. [Ref 27] Another described the need on the 
part of the Swiss for absolute clarity to a much higher degree than normally 
provided in a technical package they received. A high UAI also reveals a 
suspicion toward foreigners as managers. Knowledge of this tendency could 
be valuable to a "foreigner" en route to Switzerland as it would provide that 
expatriate with an alert to how necessary it is to be sensitive to the image and 
demeanor portrayed while new · foreign counterparts are assessing the 
newcomer. This distrust of foreigners does not stop with management and 
business; for instance, foreigners have no voting rights in Switzerland. 
Foreknowledge of this tendency is important for both the employee and 
family members when preparing to live in Switzerland. [Ref 18 :p.l22-143] 
45 
4. Masculinity 
Finally, the Swiss reflect a higher Masculinity Index than do the 
Americans. Both countries were in the top half of all countries surveyed, 
indicating strong masculinity characteristics among both populations. The 
higher index rating on the part of Switzerland correctly reflects a higher 
differentiation in that country of the roles of the sexes and a stronger belief 
that "men should dominate in all settings." [Ref 18:p.205] In fact, Swiss 
women only obtained the right to vote in 1971. [Ref 31 :p.342] Other 
characteristics typical of a higher MAS value are the delineation of 
occupations based on sex, a greater affinity to Catholicism, and fewer women 
in more qualified and higher-paid jobs. More than 50 percent of Swiss are 
Roman Catholic and the Emmen region where the F/A-18 is assembled is in a 
primarily Catholic area. [Ref 31 :p.350] Additionally, when asked about the 
absence of women during a walk-through of the manufacturing floor and 
assembly area of the F I A-18, both Swiss managers replied that there was one 
woman employed in a technical job. Any other women in the area were in 
secretarial roles. [Ref 32] While not hostile towards women in the workplace, 
the reality of Switzerland is that most women do not work outside of the 
home. This is an important factor to consider and to expect for employees 
and their families when living in Switzerland. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the Swiss cultural dimensions in comparison to the 
cultural tendencies of the United States has revealed a high degree of 
concurrence between the perceptions of the U.S. personnel who have been 
involved in the Swiss F I A-18 FMS case. While no concrete data can be 
provided to indicate a higher degree of awareness on the part of those U.S. 
persons who have received intercultural training, it can be anticipated that 
those people who had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 
principles of intercultural interaction may have been more open to the Swiss 
and more accepting of the differences in behavior and attitudes they 
encountered. This Chapter demonstrated one resource available to gain an 
understanding of a foreign culture in advance of actual contact. 
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V. FIA-18 FOREIGN MILITARY SALE TO FINLAND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter presents and analyzes the cultural implications of the 
Foreign Military Sale to Finland of the F I A-18 fighter aircraft. A discussion 
introducing the facts of the sale to Finland is included, followed by a sample 
of the perspectives of some U.S. and Finnish personnel involved in the 
day-to-day administration and management of the FMS case. The cultural 
training of the U.S. personnel interviewed is also addressed. The Chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the Finnish culture, again using Hofstede's 
cultural model and four indices. 
B. FIA-18 SALE TO FINLAND 
In May of 1992, the Finnish government chose the McDonnell Douglas 
F I A-18 as its replacement for their current inventory of Russian Mig-21 s and 
Swedish Drakens. The F I A-18 was selected following a competition that 
included the American General Dynamics F -16, the French Dassault Mirage 
2000, the Swedish JAS-39, and the Russian Mig-29. [Ref 33:p.9] There were 
64 aircraft ordered, including 57 F I A-18C single-seat aircraft and seven 
F I A-18D two-seat aircraft. [Ref 34] As with the Swiss deal, McDonnell 
Douglas is the prime contractor, with subcontractors including Northrop 
Grumman, General Electric, Hughes, and ITT Westinghouse. [Ref 35] 
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NAVAIR provides similar administrative management, review, and oversight 
as with the Swiss program. The sale price for the aircraft was approximately 
$3 billion, with the U.S. contractors agreeing to an additional $3 billion offset 
deal that is viewed by the Finns as a means to guarantee business for a 
recessive economy. [Ref 33:p.7] 
All F I A-18Ds are to be built by McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis, 
Missouri, while the 57 F I A-18Cs are to be assembled in Finland by a Finnish 
company named Finavitec. The goal for Finavitec is to become independent 
for all future engine overhaul repair work through the knowledge it will gain 
assembling both the aircraft and the General Electric engines that the F I A-18 
use, "... independence being the backbone of Finnish defence policy." 
[Ref 34] Finavitec is a subcontractor to McDonnell Douglas. 
McDonnell Douglas and its subcontractors have had personnel assigned 
in Finland since 1993. A strong presence will be maintained until the 
in-country assembly of the aircraft is complete in 1999, with a smaller 
contingent remaining in Finland after the year 2000 for maintenance and 
repair assistance. More than 28 employees have worked in Finland since the 
beginning of 1995, with 16 of these employees having a tour in Finland of at 
least six months. Presently there are 11 personnel in Finland on a full-time 
basis, most of whom also have a spouse accompanying them. [Ref 36] At 
least a dozen employees of McDonnell Douglas and Northrop Grumman have 
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traveled to Finland for short-duration visits, with some o( these employees 
traveling from Switzerland to assist in the Finnish program on a short-term 
basis. As with the Swiss program, a U.S.-based McDonnell Douglas program 
team consists of approximately 3 0 employees fully dedicated to the Finnish 
program. [Ref 37] The stateside program manager splits time between the St. 
Louis office and Finland, with about 3 0 percent of the work time spent in 
Finland. [Ref 29] 
NA V AIR support of the Finnish program closely mirrors that of the 
Swiss program. The NAV AIR Finnish Program Manager travels to Finland at 
least three times a year with a small team for administrative and assistance 
reviews. Other interactions between the Finns and the NAVAIR team occur 
on a regular basis with Finnish personnel who are assigned in the U.S. to 
oversee administrative matters of this FMS case. [Ref 38] 
C. THE FINNISH PEOPLE AND THE FMS CASE 
Personnel from McDonnell Douglas, Northrop Grumman, and NAVAIR 
were interviewed about their roles in the Finnish FMS case and their 
experiences with the Finnish culture. A vice-president of Finavitec was also 
interviewed about his experiences with Americans involved in the F I A-18 
program and his perceptions of differences between his own culture and that 
of the United States. 
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1. Intercultural Training 
All FMS case personnel interviewed were questioned about the 
intercultural training they had received prior to involvement with anyone 
from Finland. The NA V AIR program manager had attended several DISAM 
courses at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, most of which concentrated 
on FMS procedures. Although he had not attended any courses specifically 
designed for intercultural training, he had extensive experience with other 
FMS cases, including one involving South Korea. Also, the Navy 
International Programs Office (Navy IPO), which is responsible for the 
management of international program policy for the Secretary of the Navy, 
provided the personnel on both the South Korean case and the Finnish case 
with general guidance about those respective nations. [Ref 6:p. 481] This 
guidance essentially took the form of "do's and don'ts" and basic cultural 
information considered important to avoid offending anyone from the foreign 
nation. [Ref 38] 
One effective measure that NA V AIR took in the Finnish program was 
to "pair up" some of the personnel assigned to the case with a Finnish 
counterpart. For example, one manager was paired with a Finnish manager of 
approximately the same age, gender, ~ducation level, and with similar 
hobbies. According to the manager, it was very easy to develop a relationship 
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with his Finnish counterpart, to gain mutual trust, and to iearn more about 
each other's cultures. [Ref 38] 
Similar to the Swiss case, U.S. contractor personnel generally had not 
attended any formalized intercultural training. When asked about the level of 
training provided to people moving to Finland, one stateside manager 
commented, " ... the answer to that question is 'none'. My recommendation is 
that it become much more than 'none'." [Ref 39] However, a director living in 
Finland for over a year now commented that, 
We received a large notebook full of interesting facts and 
articles regarding Finland. It also had a list of recommended 
reading regarding the Finnish culture that was readily available 
at the local library. In addition, we had several conferences with 
an employee from the travel division of McDonnell Douglas, 
who had been to Finland several times. All in all, we knew what 
to expect before we got here. [Ref 40] 
Another employee based in the U.S. had attended a four-hour course offered 
through the McDonnell Douglas Voluntary Improvement Program (VIP) that 
he said was available to all personnel working on the Finnish program. This 
course included information on Finnish history, government, laws and 
regulations, and the Finnish people. [Ref 3 7] He also stressed screening as an 
integral part of the process for selecting people on the Finnish program team. 
Many of the people assigned to the program have had experience with other 
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international programs and are accustomed to interacting with other cultures. 
[Ref 37] However, this screening does not include the employee's family. 
[Ref 29] 
Whether from an employee working in Finland or an employee based in 
the U.S., the common explanation for the absence of formalized intercultural 
training was lack of time. The most prevalent opinion is that once someone is 
chosen to go overseas on a program, the most important priority is to prepare 
that person for the business aspects of the role to be filled, rather than on 
general or specific intercultural training. No consideration seems to be given 
to the generic issue of how to integrate effectively with people from other 
cultures by any personnel in the international programs office of the 
contractors. When asked about their cultural training, every manager 
interviewed thought only of country specific training. 
The F I A-18 Deputy Program Manager of International Programs at 
NAVAIR also agrees that NAVAIR international personnel could be better 
prepared to interact with foreign personnel. However, he stressed the fact 
that a team does not have very much time to respond once a request from a 
new country is submitted, let alone trying to get additional cultural training 
about that country. [Ref 41] Again, the belief seems to be that cultural 
training means "country specific" training, vice general intercultural 
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communication exposure that would benefit an employee interacting with any 
new country. 
Finally, as in the Swiss case, no statistics are available documenting 
the numbers of employees who returned early from Finland due to difficulties 
working in the host nation. However, according to one NAVAIR manager, at 
least one Government employee was invited to depart Finland early from a 
business trip by his supervisor after "unacceptable" behavior towards the 
Finns. [Ref 38] 
2. Perceptions of the Finnish People 
When asked to describe Finnish "personality," answers again varied 
little across organizational backgrounds. A director living in Finland 
described his counterparts as 
... extremely shy quiet people. If they don't know you, they don't 
smile often, but after getting to know them, they are warm and 
kind and in many cases, you have made lifetime friends. They 
love Americans and anything you can tell them about America. 
They are an extremely literate society and possess an incredible 
amount of knowledge regarding the USA. [Ref 40] 
The NA V AIR manager noticed an apparent "paranoia" of Russia, based on 
Finnish history with that bordering nation. He cited the fact that the Finns 
were adamant about not procuring any air-to-ground weapons for their 
F I A-18s, in an effort to assert the fact that their aircraft were for defensive 
purposes only. [Ref 38] 
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When asked about gender differences in Finland, personnel based in the 
U.S. and in Finland have noticed that the Finns are very nondiscriminatory in 
assigning work roles to women. The Director of Procurement Management of 
the F I A-18 program is a Finnish woman, an occurrence that would not be 
found in Switzerland. A Government employee commented on the fact that in 
Finland, there is no distinction between genders when it comes to business or 
social activities. The only distinction commented upon was in regard to the 
social activity the Finns use on a regular basis for "relationship building" in 
the work area: the sauna. Two U.S.-based managers commented that it is 
very hard to get used to the idea of being so open and exposed with several 
men they hardly know, in addition to the fact that any women on their team 
are excluded from these activities, which do, in fact, aid in building trust and 
a sense of teamwork. [Ref 3 7] [Ref 3 8] 
Two other managers, one based m the U.S. and one based in 
Switzerland who has traveled occasionally to Finland on a consultant basis, 
both noticed that the Finns tend to stand back and observe in a more receptive 
manner than the Swiss; they do not micromanage, but rather state what they 
desire and expect that it will occur. They are receptive to instruction, with a 
goal of eventual independence in the maintenance of their newly acquired 
aircraft. [Ref 29] [Ref 42] 
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In contrast with the Swiss case, the language barrier was cited by U.S. 
personnel as a difficulty, but a minor one. Much of this is due to the fact that 
although many of the Americans in Finland attempt to learn the language, it is 
ranked as the second most difficult language to learn. [Ref 40] Therefore, 
unlike German in Switzerland, which many U.S. personnel can at least learn 
several useful phrases, there is a heavy reliance on the Finn knowledge of 
English. A Finnish vice-president with Finavitec believes that although there 
are minor difficulties with some people whose fluency in English is not very 
strong, it is a relatively minor problem. He commented that he has spoken 
English for 40 years as a fourth language, as do many of his countrymen. 
[Ref 35] 
When asked to describe his own people's culture and personality, this 
same manager described it as, 
... honest, straight-forward, thinking before answering, inert, not 
very talkative, means what he says, keeps his promises, not good 
at small t~lk. The Finns are proud of their quality both at the 
organizational and individual level. At all managerial levels 
people are accustomed to trust that the given tasks will be done. 
Individualism is the key word. It is almost a rule that whenever 
a task is given, the individual starts thinking how could I do it 
easier, better, faster, cheaper. Giving tight orders without 
explaining why only leads to bad cooperation. I understand that 
in the U.S. workers are generally doing as ordered. [Ref 35] 
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D. INTERPRETATION OF THE CULTURAL INDICES 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the Finnish culture by using 
Hofstede's cultural dimension model. As with the Swiss evaluation, the value 
of this analysis lies in the comparison between the U.S. indices values and 
those of Finland. Regardless of one's unfamiliarity with the Finnish culture, a 
typical American can use knowledge of the U.S. culture and Hofstede's index 
ratings to be prepared for the tendencies likely to be displayed when 
interacting with the Finnish people. This knowledge could help to alleviate 
discomfort and misunderstandings when dealing with the Finnish people on a 
regular basis. Table 5.1 lists the four cultural indices, along with the index 
values for both the U.S. and Finland. The four dimensions represented are the 
Power Distance Index (PDI), the Individualism Index (IDV), the Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index (UAI), and the Masculinity Index (MAS). 
United States Finland 
Power Distance 40 33 
Individualism 91 63 
Uncertainty 46 59 
Avoidance 
Masculinity 62 26 
Table 5.1. U.S. and Finnish Indices Values [After Ref 18] 
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Using the information in Table 5.1, a manager anticipating interacting 
with Finnish people can develop some broad guidelines about what to expect 
from his Finnish counterparts. Expected societal norms for lower or higher 
index ratings , which will assist in interpreting the Finnish indices as opposed 
to the ratings of the United States is set out in the Appendix. 
1. Power Distance 
Finland's PDI value of 33 and the U.S. value of 40 are fairly low, with 
more than half of the countries surveyed receiving higher PDis. The highest 
PDI awarded in the survey was a 94. [Ref 18:p.77] The closeness of the U.S. 
and Finnish scores indicate a great deal of similarity in the two cultures with 
regard to the Power Distance characteristics, with the Finnish people 
generally embodying the characteristics of a "low PDI" society to a slightly 
greater extent than Americans. Some of these characteristics, which are 
included in the Appendix, are a belief that the powerful should attempt to 
appear less powerful than they are and that equal rights are imperative. Some 
consequences for organizations of lower PDis are less centralization and a 
smaller proportion of supervisory personnel, an indicator which supports 
earlier comments from Finnish personnel about the independent nature of 
their workers. [Ref 18:p.l 06] 
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2. Individualism 
The IDV ranges from 12 to 91, with the United States receiving the 
highest score. Finland's index rating of 63 places it in the top half of all 
countries surveyed, but with tendencies of high IDV countries to a lesser 
extent than the U.S. Finland's relatively high IDV, as compared with other 
nations, is in concert with the Finnish manager's assertion that individual 
autonomy for workers is displayed routinely in the Finnish workplace. 
[Ref 35] Some other connotations for higher IDV countries are that more 
importance is attached to freedom and challenge in jobs and that individual 
decisions are better than group decisions. Other consequences of higher 
IDV countries are more press freedom and balanced political systems. 
[Ref 18: p.173] Finland has undergone a "revolution" in these areas with the 
recent fall of the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) and is continually 
striving to maintain its "individualism" from Russia. [Ref 33] It is important 
to note again that although the Finnish IDV does indicate a relatively high 
level of the individualism characteristics, Americans should, on average, 
display these high IDV characteristics to a greater degree that the Finns. The 
value of this information is in comparative judgments. 
3. Uncertainty Avoidance 
With a range from 8 to 112, the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) 
provides a guideline for a population's ability to cope with stress, change, and 
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the unknown. Finland's UAI of 59 and the U.S.' value of 36 put them in the 
lower half of all nations surveyed. Of all countries surveyed, one consistency 
was that all of the younger democracies, such as Finland, indicated higher 
UAis than older democracies such as the United States. [Ref 18: 
p.l22-135] However, with Finland having only a slightly higher UAI, an 
American interacting with the Finnish people should anticipate that the 
characteristics for a low UAI country are present in Finland, but to a lesser 
extent than amongst a U.S. population. Some of these characteristics and 
their consequences include confidence in younger people and in delegating 
authority, lower job stress, and preference for broader guidelines. [Ref 18: 
p. 140-143] This description supports a comment by a U.S. manager that the 
Finns "stand back, watch, or say 'this is what I want' and trust it will be done" 
[Ref 42] 
4. Masculinity 
It is in the area of Masculinity that the U.S. and Finnish dimension 
diverge significantly. With a range from five to 95, the U.S. MAS of 62 is in 
the top half of all countries surveyed, while Finland's 26 is in the bottom half. 
Americans interacting with Finns will discover more of a service ideal, with a 
belief in developing strong relationships with managers and co-workers. Low 
MAS countries typically have far less differentiation between jobs that are 
designed "for men" and "for women," as indicated by a female Minister of 
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Defense in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Finland. Sodal roles are very 
important in Finnish organizations, as witnessed by the U.S. employees 
initially uncomfortable with the role of the sauna in Finnish business life. On 
the other hand, the high MAS of the U.S. represents a tendency of traditional 
male and female roles where men are the "breadwinners" in families. Certain 
occupations are expected to be filled by men, and certain occupations are 
expected to be filled by women. The wide disparity between the two index 
values indicates a large difference in cultural norms of which an American 
working in Finland or with Finns should be aware. [Ref 18 :p.190-207] 
E. CONCLUSION 
As with the analysis comparing the indices of Switzerland and the U.S., 
this comparison of Finnish indices with U.S. scores reveals a high level of 
similarity between the observations of Americans working with the Finnish 
people and the expectations of the Finnish culture that could be developed 
using Hofstede's dimensions. Since most of the personnel interviewed have 
worked on the Finnish program for three to four years, it is probable that 
many of their observations and comments have the benefit of prolonged 
interaction and intimate knowledge of the Finnish people. Additionally, many 
of the people interviewed had either some amount of cultural training and 
briefings or have had in excess of five years experience with international 
programs and interaction. However, every U.S. employee interviewed, 
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regardless of employment background, stressed the need for extensive 




VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This research was conducted to address the pnmary and subsidiary 
questions outlined in Chapter I. It is appropriate to re-address these questions 
to ensure that adequate answers have been provided for each of them. 
1. Primary Research Question 
How does the culture of a buying nation affect a Foreign Military Sales 
program and how might that knowledge assist in the successful execution of a 
FMS program? 
As addressed throughout Chapters II, IV, and V, the different culture of 
a buying nation may have a profound impact on a FMS program. Specifically, 
the different culture requires a readjustment of the typical manner in which 
our contractors and the Federal Government do business. Dealing with a 
foreign nation as a buyer requires a great deal more sensitivity to the varying 
norms of that country with regard to how to build trust in business 
relationships or the degree of involvement and demand a country will have 
with administering a program. Determining exactly what the customer wants 
is more difficult when that customer looks at the world through different eyes. 
If the personnel interacting with people from other nations on FMS 
cases have a solid background in intercultural communication, the benefit will 
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be programs that have fewer personality conflicts, and employees, from both 
countries who have a higher level of comfort in dealing with "foreigners." 
Whether it be generic "how to get along comfortably" intercultural training or 
country-specific training, ensuring that our employees possess a global 
mindset rather than a parochial vision of business and the way people "ought 
to act" will only benefit our defense industry as it strives for more 
international business in an increasing competitive environment. 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
a. What are the key cultural factors that may affect a FMS or 
contractual relationship? 
This question is answered in broad terms using Geert Hofstede's 
cultural dimensions. The key cultural factors that will impact a FMS case are 
those factors with which the United States and its people most differ from its 
customer country. The broad dimensions that can be used to evaluate a 
culture and its variability with that of the United States are power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Within these four 
dimensions a wide variety of specific characteristics can be predicted of the 
population of the country evaluated. This is not a "cook book" formula, but 
rather provides tendencies for the population at large. Individuals will always 
vary around the specific value assigned to a country as a result of its survey. 
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b. To what extent are the cultural practices/differences of a buying 
nation evaluated when entering into a Foreign Military Sales 
agreement to determine possible effects that culture may have on 
negotiations/administration of the program? 
The differing cultures of buying nations are not specifically 
evaluated by any agency when a FMS arrangement is formed in order to 
determine how that culture may impact the program at large. There is an 
effort on the part of the Federal Government and the defense contractors 
involved to provide their people with some level of information about the 
country prior to interacting with their international buyers. Some agencies do 
make an effort to educate their employees in intercultural interaction, but 
often the resources available in this area are underutilized due to a sense of 
urgency in negotiating or administering a program. 
c. What are the impacts of the Finnish and Swiss cultures on their 
respective F/A-18 Foreign Military Sales programs? 
Chapters IV and V fully discuss the Swiss and Finnish F I A-18 
FMS cases and review the impact of those respective cultures on the 
programs. Little information exists to support an assertion that personnel 
have been relieved from either program due to intercultural problems. 
However, people on both programs cited numerous examples of differences in 
the way the Swiss or the Finns do business, socialize, or interact with the 
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FMS personnel. Most of these comments can be correlated io the differences 
in broad cultural dimensions between the U.S. and Switzerland or Finland. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis identified the effects that cultural differences can have on 
Foreign Military Sales programs. Much of the impact is subjective and 
interpersonal. In an era of declining domestic defense budgets, defense 
contractors will become more involved in the international trade arena. 
Additionally, faced with an increasingly competitive international arms 
market, U.S. defense companies are being forced to become more savvy in 
marketing their products abroad. As this trend continues, so must U.S. 
Government and contractor personnel become more savvy in interacting with 
people from other cultures in negotiating and administering the programs they 
do sell. The price of failure in this area is a poor reputation for the United 
States in international business, and perhaps eventually losing badly needed 
contracts to foreign competitors who know how to interact with different 
cultures. Although many options exist for all personnel, both Government 
and contractor, to become educated about intercultural interaction, the 
prevailing attitude is that the training takes too much time. In fact, cross-
cultural communication courses may be received in a matter of hours or days 
and the benefits of this education versus "trial and error" interaction with our 
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foreign customers will be readily noticed and appreciated by our foreign 
customers. 
C. REC,OMMENDATIONS 
Most of the intercultural training or experiences of the personnel 
interviewed for this study took the form of books, instructions of the "do's 
and don'ts" of the foreign culture, or on-the-job training. While on-the-job 
experience can result in an employee well-suited for intercultural interaction, 
many missteps may occur before any significant experience is attained. Many 
resources are available for training prior to interacting with a foreign culture. 
Advance training is preferable to the on-the-job, by-default approach. Prior 
training can prevent many conflicts with foreign buyers. It can prepare 
employees for interacting with new cultures, and can save companies and the 
Government time by reducing the number of cultural blunders that must be 
handled. Training can also save money by ensuring that employees are 
prepared for and suited to intercultural interaction prior to traveling abroad 
and then discovering that they are not. 
Numerous sources for intercultural training have been cited throughout 
this study. For Government personnel, the Air Force Special Operations' 
Cross Cultural Communications Course offers a broad indoctrination for 
developing a mindset conducive to doing business with foreigners. This 
course is five days and the course trainers travel to distant locations to 
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provide the course to any Department of Defense agency. that requests it. 
With the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) 
courses tailored to the administrative specifics of a FMS case, the Special 
Operations Course offers a thorough indoctrination for employees specifically 
tailored to intercultural communications. 
For civilian personnel involved in international programs, many other 
training resources exist other than the books and pamphlets most typically 
provided. The consultant services discussed in Chapter II such as seminars 
offered by Professional Training Associates and the Intercultural Training 
Institute at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, can be geared to 
general cross-cultural training or region specific, as requested. 
The benefits of the generic intercultural training are that the company 
acquires an employee who has been offered the resources to develop a 
mindfulness of other cultures and can more readily adapt to interacting with 
other foreign customers in the future. The Federal Government and its 
defense contractors should lead the way for American international businesses 
in ensuring that its people are among the best at being sensitive to cross-
cultural communication. 
70 
D. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Some recommendations for future research include an examination of 
the use of the Integrated Product Team (IPT) philosophy on FMS cases. IPTs 
and the associated team-building activities in conjunction with them may be 
effectively used by Government agencies, contractors, and host nation 
personnel to help bridge cultural gaps. 
A second recommendation is to expand the scope of this study by 
examining programs wjth other countries. Hofstede's model may be applied 
to determine further correlation between his cultural dimensions and the 
cultural experiences of the FMS case personnel. If this model provides an 
accurate prediction of the cultural differences between the U.S. and other 




APPENDIX. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF 
CULTURE 
THE POWER DISTANCE SOCIETAL NORM 
Low PDI High PDI 
Inequality in society should be minimized. There should be an order of inequality in this 
world in which everyone has his rightful 
place; high and low are protected by this 
order. 
All should be independent. 
Hierarchy means an inequality of roles, 
established for convenience. 
Subordinates are people like me. 
Superiors are people like me. 
A few should be independent, most should be 
dependent. 
Hierarchy means existential inequality. 
Superiors consider subordinates as being of a 
different kind. 
Subordinates consider superiors as being of a 
different kind. 
The use of power should be legitimate and is Power is a basic fact of society which 
subject to the judgment between good and antedates good or evil. Its legitimacy is 
evil. irrelevant. 
All should have equal rights. 
Powerful people should try to look less 
powerful than they are. 
Stress on reward, legitimate and expert 
power. 
The system is to blame. 
The way to change a social system is by 
redistributing power. 
People at various power levels feel less 
threatened and more prepared to trust people. 
Latent harmony between the powerful and 
powerless. 
Cooperation among the powerless can be 
based on solidarity. 
Powerholders are entitled to privileges. 
Powerful people should try to look as 
powerful as possible. 
Stress on coercive and referent power. 
The underdog is to blame. 
The way to change a social system is by 
dethroning those in power. 
Other people are a potential threat to one's 
power and rarely can be trusted. 
Latent conflict between powerful and the 
powerless. 
Cooperation among the powerless is difficult 




THE INDIVIDUALISM SOCIETAL NORM 
Low IDV 
In society, people are born into extended 
families or clans which protect them in 
exchange for loyalty. 
"We" consciousness. 
Collectivity-orientation 
Identity is based in the social system. 
Emotional dependence of individual on 
organizations and institutions. 
Emphasis on belonging to organization; 
membership ideal. 
Private life is invaded by organizations and 
clans to which one belongs; opinions are 
predetermined. 
Expertise, order, duty, security provided by 
organization or clan. 
Friendships predetermined by stable social 
relationships; but need for prestige within 
these relationships. 
Belief in group decisions. 
Value standards differ for ingoups and 
outgroups; particularism. 
High IDV 
In society, everyone is supposed to take care 




Identity is based in the individual. 
Emotional independence of individual from 
organizations or institutions. 
Emphasis on individual initiative and 
achievement; leadership ideal. 
Everyone has a right to a private life and 
opinion. 
Autonomy, variety, pleasure, individual 
financial security. 
Need for specific friendships. 
Belief in individual decisions. 




THE UNCERTAINTY A VOIDANCE SOCIETAL- NORM 
Low UAI 
The uncertainty inherent in life is more 
easily accepted and each day is taken as it 
comes. 
Ease, lower stress. 
Time is free. 
Hard work is not a virtue, per se. 
Weaker super-egos. 
Aggressive behavior is frowned upon. 
High UAI 
The uncertainty inherent in life is felt as a 
continuous threat that must be fought_ 
Higher anxiety and stress. 
Time is money. 
Inner urge to work hard. 
Strong super-egos 
Aggressive behavior of self and others is 
accepted. 
Less showing of emotions. More showing of emotions. 
Conflict and competition can be contained on Conflict and competition can unleash 
the level of fair play and used constructively. aggression and should therefore be avoided. 
More acceptance of dissent. 
Deviance is not felt as threatening; greater 
tolerance. 
Less nationalism. 
More positive towards young people. 
Less conservatism. 
More willingness to take risks in life. 
Achievement determined in terms of 
recognition. 
Relativism, empiricism. 
There should be as few rules as possible. 
If rules cannot be kept, we should change 
them. 
Belief in generalists and common sense. 
The authorities are there to serve the 
citizens. 
Strong need for consensus. 
Deviant persons and ideas are dangerous; 
intolerance. 
Nationalism. 
Younger people are suspect. 
Conservatism, law and order. 
Concern with security in life. 
Achievement defined in terms of security. 
Search for ultimate, absolute truths and 
values. 
Need for written rules and regulations. 
If rules cannot be kept, we are sinners and 
should repent. 
Belief in experts and their knowledge. 




THE MASCULINITY SOCIETAL NORM-
Low MAS 
People orientation. 
Quality of life and environment are 
important. 




Sympathy for the unfortunate. 
High MAS 
Money and things orientation. 
Performance and growth are important. 




Sympathy for the successful achiever. 
Leveling: do not try to be better than others. Excelling: try to be the best. 
Small and slow are beautiful. Bug and fast are beautiful. 
Men need not be assertive but can also take 
caring roles. 
Sex roles in society should be fluid. 
Differences in sex roles should not mean 
differences in power. 
Unisex and androgyny ideal. 
Men should behave assertively and women 
should care. 
Sex roles in society should be clearly 
differentiated. 
Men should dominate in all settings. 
Machismo ( ostentative manliness) ideal. 
[Ref 18:p.205] 
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